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 Prethodno priopćenje
Summary
Mergers and acquisitions of Croatian target companies may involve significant 
tax risks for domestic and foreign acquirers. Over the recent years, Croatian 
tax authorities have started to vigorously assess the economic substance of the 
envisaged M&As, often denying the acquirer different tax benefits, thus making 
the entire restructuring costlier. In doing so, Croatian tax authorities rely on a 
myriad of domestic anti-tax avoidance rules according to which M&A operations 
may be characterised as abusive. Accordingly, this paper offers a descriptive and 
systematic account on how Croatian anti-tax avoidance legislation may hinder 
M&A activity. Thereby, our aim is primarily to explore, both from a substantive 
and procedural point of view, the imagined boundary between legitimate and 
abusive tax planning. 
Keywords: mergers and acquisitions; tax planning; lawfully avoiding payment 
of taxes; tax neutrality; burden of proof; the general rule against 
tax evasion.
N. ŽUNIĆ KOVAČEVIĆ, S. GADŽO, Tax-related Risks of Mergers and Acquisitions...
Zb. Prav. fak. Sveuč. u Rij., vol. 39, br. 4 (Posebni broj), 1731-1749 (2018)1732
1. INTRODUCTION
It is well accepted in the business community that mergers and acquisitions 
(hereinafter: M&As) may offer significant tax benefits to the participating parties, but 
concurrently involve significant tax risks.1 Thus, the structuring of the overall scheme 
of M&A, both in domestic and cross-border setting, necessarily calls for a healthy 
degree of tax planning, with the aim to mitigate pertinent tax hazards, e.g. related 
to the deduction of interest expenses, valuation of acquired assets, capital gains tax 
liability etc.2 
Choosing the right “tax structure” of M&A transactions has become even 
a greater challenge recently as tax authorities worldwide started to scrutinize the 
transactions with ever more vigilance, putatively worried about potential tax abuse 
and ensuing losses of tax revenues in the post-structuring period.3 While transfer 
pricing rules denote the most prominent legal instrument at the disposal of revenue 
bodies in challenging M&A transactions, in a number of countries significant role is 
also played by domestic anti-tax avoidance rules, such as a general anti-avoidance 
rule (hereinafter: GAAR).4 Comparative experience shows that the application of 
domestic anti-abuse rules to M&A transactions boils down to the examination of 
commercial substance and rationale of the restructuring taken as a whole, as well as 
its individual steps.5 
Insights from the Croatian M&A practice reveal that Croatian Tax Administration 
(hereinafter: CTA) may go to great lengths in fully or partially denying the right of 
the acquirer to utilize some valuable tax assets or other tax attributes of the target 
company. In doing so, CTA relies upon a hotchpotch of anti-avoidance rules that have 
been enshrined in domestic legislation over the past decade or so, particularly in the 
post-EU accession period.6 As a result, not only does the tax terrain of M&As in 
Croatia become very risky from a substantive point of view, but also, from a procedural 
perspective, it may be very cumbersome for the taxpayer to demonstrate proper 
business purpose(s) underlying the restructuring and thus quash the presumption of 
abusive behaviour. 
Against this backdrop, this paper explores how Croatian anti-tax avoidance 
legislation interacts with M&A activities involving Croatian target companies. In 
1 See e.g. Endres, D., Spengel, C. D., (eds.), International Company Taxation and Tax Planning, 
Kluwer Law International, 2015, p. 489.
2 For a general overview see Blessing, P. H., Key Global Tax Concerns, in Blessing, P. H., 
(ed.), Tax Planning for International Mergers, Acquisitions, Joint Ventures and Restructurings, 
Kluwer Law International 2017, pp. 1-17.
3 See e.g. Cotrut, M., Ambagtsheer-Pakarinen, L., Business Restructurings: The Toolkit for 
Tackling Abusive International Tax Structures, in: Cotrut, M. (ed.), International Tax Structures 
in the BEPS Era: An Analysis of Anti-Abuse Measures, Online Books IBFD 2015, sec. 7.1.
4 See Kroppen, H., Silva, J. C., General Report, in IFA Cahiers Vol. 96a: Cross-border business 
restructuring, 2011, pp. 27-31.
5 See Cotrut, M., Ambagtsheer-Pakarinen, L., op. cit., sec. 7.3.
6 For a recent general overview of Croatian anti-tax avoidance legislation see Žunić Kovačević, 
N., Croatia, in Dourado, A. P., (ed.), Tax Avoidance Revisited in the EU BEPS Context, IBFD 
2017. 
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doing so, particular attention is drawn to some selected issues that breed uncertainties 
and disputes, such as carry-forwards of transferring entity’s tax losses. Our principal 
aim is to try to delimit when an M&A tax structure crosses the imaginary boundary 
between legitimate tax planning and tax abuse. 
2. MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN THE LIGHT OF CROATIAN 
ANTI-ABUSE LEGISLATION
On a raft of concerns regarding tax structuring of M&A transactions, a key issue 
is whether and under which conditions potentially valuable tax assets and other tax 
attributes of the target company (e.g. loss carry-forwards, excess tax credits, benefits 
approved by a tax ruling) survive the transaction, i.e. whether the acquirer may use 
these attributes in the post-acquisition period.7 Typically, if an M&A transaction is 
carried on in the form of a “share deal”, where the legal ownership of target’s shares is 
transferred from the seller to the buyer, such tax attributes of the target are preserved 
and may be subsequently utilized by the buyer.8 In other words, share transactions 
generally ensure tax neutrality, which is one of the key concepts in M&A tax planning.
2.1. Legal requirements for tax-neutral mergers and acquisitions
Under Croatian law, tax neutrality in the course of M&As has been assured by 
the provisions of Articles 19 and 20 of the Profits Tax Act (hereinafter: PTA).9 Art. 
19(1) PTA sets out that the key requirement for a tax-neutral merger or division is 
the so-called “continuity in taxation” (kontinuitet u oporezivanju). As per Art. 19(2) 
PTA, the continuity requirement is deemed to be satisfied if, during the transfer to the 
acquiring company, there are no changes in the assessment of assets and liabilities, 
i.e. if there is a roll-over of book values, for tax purposes, of the assets and liabilities 
involved. 
Herein the acquirer encounters some risk stemming from the target’s financial 
accounting practices in the pre-restructuring period. Namely, in case the acquiring 
company had opted for the use of the revaluation model in measuring the value of its 
on-balance-sheet assets10, there is a possibility that transferring assets are not valued 
at their fair value at the date of the acquisition. The Croatian Tax Administration has 
addressed this issue in a non-binding tax ruling of 11 March 2011, faced with the 
factual situation of a partial division transaction, in which immovable property, deemed 
to constitute a separate branch of activity for tax purposes, has been transferred from 
one existing company to another in exchange for the shares of the latter; with regard 
to the question at stake, the CTA convincingly argued that the continuity requirement 
7 See Blessing P. H., op. cit., pp. 5-6.
8 See ibid., p. 4. Compare also Endres, D., Spengel, C., op. cit., pp. 491-494. 
9 Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia, nos., 177/04, 90/05, 57/06, 146/08, 146/08, 80/10, 
22/12, 148/13, 143/14, 50/16, 115/16.
10 Generally on the difference between the cost model and the revaluation model see Koek, 
M., Van den Berg, T., Special Items, in Bakker, A., Van den Berg T., Janssen, B., (eds.), Tax 
Accounting: Unravelling the Mystery of Income Taxes, IBFD 2015, sec. 9.6.1.2.
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for a tax-neutral transaction is not fulfilled, since the value of the counter-payment for 
the transferred assets far exceeded their book value.11 For our purpose it is particularly 
interesting to note that the CTA also used an anti-tax abuse thread of thinking in 
assessing the given set of facts, especially because the transferor and the transferee 
were associated persons. 
In any case, important legislative developments in this area have arisen 
following Croatia’s accession to the European Union (hereinafter: EU) on July 1st 
2013. Most notably, on that very date the amendments to the PTA came into force, 
by virtue of which the provisions of the EU Merger Directive were transposed into 
Croatian domestic law.12 In this regard it has to be noted first that the aims and legal 
consequences of the Merger Directive13 are fully aligned with the general rules of 
the PTA on tax-neutrality as regards M&As, laid out above.14 Second, the Croatian 
legislator has opted, presumably wittingly, to extend the scope of application of the 
domestic provisions transposing the Merger Directive covering purely domestic 
corporate reorganizations as well.15 This becomes clear upon reading the relevant 
administrative regulations, specifically, the then Ordinance on Profits Tax (hereinafter: 
OPT)16, explicitly laying down uniform procedural requirements for domestic and 
cross-border intra-EU M&As.17 Moreover, such equal treatment has been confirmed 
in the CTA’s non-binding tax ruling dated May 28th 2014.18 Accordingly, it seems that 
administrative practice affirms the view that the relationship between Articles 19 and 
20 PTA on the one hand, and the newly enacted Articles 20.a-20.r PTA corresponds to 
the one between general and special norms. 
The portrayed benefits of tax neutrality in the M&A context may be obtained 
only upon completion of several procedural steps, as set out in Articles 41.g – 41.j 
OPT. First of all, the acquirer is obliged to notify the CTA of the planned transaction – 
i.e. merger, division, exchange of shares or transfer of assets – and enclose all relevant 
information, most importantly the financial statements of the target company and a 
detailed depiction of the commercial and financial reasons underlying the transaction.19 
On this basis, tax authorities have a deadline of 90 days to issue the administrative 
11 See Croatian Tax Administration, opinion No. 410-01/10-01/2163, 11 March 2011.
12 See Articles 20.a – 20.r PTA. 
13 Council Directive 2009/133/EC of 19 October 2009 on the common system of taxation 
applicable to mergers, divisions, partial divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of shares 
concerning companies of different Member States and to the transfer of the registered office of 
an SE or SCE between Member States, OJ L 310, 25.11.2009.
14 For a general overview of the objectives of the Merger Directive see e.g. Helminen, M., EU 
Tax Law – Direct Taxation 2017, Online Books IBFD 2017, sec. 3.3.1.2.; Hofstätter M., 
Hohenwarter-Mayr, D., The Merger Directive, in: Lang, M., et al., Introduction to the European 
Tax Law on Direct Taxation, Linde 2013, pp. 158-159.
15 On this possibility see Helminen, M., op. cit., sec. 3.3.2.1.
16 Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia, nos. 95/2005, 133/2007, 156/2008, 146/2009, 
123/2010, 137/2011, 61/2012, 146/2012, 160/2013, 12/2014, 157/2014, 137/2015, 115/2016, 
1/2017, 2/2018.
17 See Article 41.j(1) of the OPT. 
18 Croatian Tax Administration, opinion No. 410-01/14-01/1387, 28 May 2014.
19 See Article 41.h – 41.j OPT.
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decision which either allows or denies the benefits of tax neutrality for the pertinent 
transaction.20 In essence, this amounts to a process of prior administrative approval, 
wherein eligibility of the taxpayer to obtain relevant tax advantages is assessed by the 
tax authorities. 
2.2. The Application of the anti-abuse rule stemming from the 
implementation of the Merger Directive
In transposing the requirements of the Merger Directive in its national 
legislation, Croatia opted to exercise the option envisaged in Article 15(1)(a) of 
the Directive21 and adopt an explicit anti-tax abuse provision on the domestic legal 
plane. Accordingly, under Article 20.p PTA, the above-described tax benefits will be 
denied if it is evident that the principal objective, or one of the principal objectives, 
of the transaction at hand is tax evasion or tax avoidance. Moreover, Article 41(h)
(6) OPT lays down that Croatian tax authorities will issue an administrative decision 
refusing to grant the advantages of tax neutrality if they determine the objective of tax 
avoidance/evasion underlying the transaction, especially if there are no valid business 
reasons for the transaction, such as reorganization or financial rationalization of the 
business in question. While the wording of the quoted provision suggests that the 
lack of a valid business or commercial motives amounts to only one example of tax 
avoidance – leading to the conclusion that the taxpayer might be engaged in abusive 
behaviour also in other circumstances – administrative practice suggests that revenue 
bodies use it as a presumption of tax avoidance, as explicitly provided in the Merger 
Directive itself.22 Such an approach of the CTA is clearly affirmed in the previously-
cited non-binding tax ruling.23 
Even more important for the participants of M&As is the way tax authorities 
apply the said provisions in practice. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the CTA relies 
on the wording of Article 41(h)(6) to fully shift the burden of proof on the taxpayer, i.e. 
that it is up to the taxpayer to prove that tax avoidance or tax evasion is not the primary 
purpose behind the reorganization. Put differently, administrative practice shows that 
when deciding on the granting of the benefits envisaged by Articles 20.a-20.r PTA, the 
CTA starts from the presumption that the intended transaction is being conducted with 
tax avoidance as one of its main purposes, even if there is no evidentiary substratum 
whatsoever supporting this position. In the second step, the onus is on the taxpayer to 
rebut this presumption, by bringing forward evidence of valid commercial purpose(s) 
underlying the reorganization, including, inter alia, the calculation of its commercial 
20 See Article 41.h(4) OPT.
21 Article 15(1)(a) Merger Directive reads as follows: „A Member State may refuse to apply or 
withdraw the benefit of all or any part of the provisions of Articles 4 to 14 where it appears that 
one of the operations referred to in Article 1 (…) has as its principal objective or as one of its 
principal objectives tax evasion or tax avoidance; the fact that the operation is not carried out 
for valid commercial reasons such as the restructuring or rationalisation of the activities of the 
companies participating in the operation may constitute a presumption that the operation has 
tax evasion or tax avoidance as its principal objective or as one of its principal objectives.”
22 See the second sentence in Article 15(1)(a) Merger Directive.
23 See Croatian Tax Administration, supra n. 18.
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and financial benefits.24 In the third and final step, the CTA assesses the economic 
substance and rationale of the reorganization and issues the authoritative decision on 
whether the legal requirements for a tax-neutral transaction have been fulfilled or not. 
In the latter case, the taxpayer can make use of the ordinary system of legal remedies 
in tax matters, including the right to an administrative review and, subsequently, the 
right to a judicial appeal.25 
In some cases tax authorities have took an unusually stringent approach, denying 
the tax advantages on the basis of purely formal errors in the documentation submitted 
by the taxpayer, even though the tax avoidance motive of the reorganization has 
not been reasonably substantiated. Accordingly, some taxpayers have found it very 
cumbersome to quash the presumption of tax avoidance, even if making a plausible 
case why the transaction at hand makes sense from a business point of view and tax 
authorities failing to submit counterevidence. Absence of clear and detailed rules on 
the required standard of evidence makes matters even more troubling. 
In our view, such practice potentially runs contrary to EU law, more specifically 
the principle of effectiveness, which sets limits on the procedural autonomy of EU 
Member States in cases where rights derived from EU law are at stake.26 We base 
this argument on recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), in 
which the Court examined the compatibility with the primary EU law of the domestic 
provisions, by which the option prescribed in (now) Article 15(1) of the Merger 
Directive has been implemented.27 First of all, it needs to be underlined that, under 
the EU principle of procedural effectiveness, Member States should refrain from 
actions that render virtually impossible or excessively difficult exercise of the rights 
derived from primary or secondary EU law, including the rights resulting from EU tax 
directives.28 Secondly, a strand of ECJ’s case law dealing with the substantive aspects 
of tax abuse in the context of the Merger Directive, confirms that Member States’ tax 
authorities may not confine themselves to applying predetermined general criteria for 
assessing whether a tax abuse is taking place, but must subject each particular case to 
a general examination of that issue.29 In other words, the implementation of the anti-
abuse clause contained in Article 15(1)(a) Merger Directive should not take the form 
of general presumptions of tax abuse, without more detailed case-by-case inquiries. 
Against this backdrop, in the Euro Park Service case, decided in March 2017, 
the ECJ addressed a more specific issue of the procedural rules applied in Member 
States in relation to granting pertinent tax advantages. The Court first affirmed the 
24 See Article 41.h(2)(8) and 41(j)(2)(10) of the OPT.
25 Generally on the system of legal remedies in Croatian tax law see Žunić Kovačević, N., 
Upravnosudska kontrola u poreznim stvarima, Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu, 
53(1), 2016, pp. 279-295.
26 On the national procedural autonomy within the EU and the principles of effectiveness and 
equivalence see Terra B., Wattel, P., European Tax Law, Kluwer Law International 2012, pp. 
120-130.
27 See in particular Judgment of 8 March 2017, Euro Park Service, EU:C:2016:806; Judgment of 
18 October 2012, Pelati, EU:C:2012:639.
28 See e.g. Judgment of 9 February 1999, Dilexport, EU:C:1999:59, para. 25. Compare also Terra 
B., Wattel, P., op. cit., p. 123 et seq.
29 See e.g. Judgment of 10 November 2011, Foggia, EU:C:2011:718, para. 37. 
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right of Member States to set up procedural schemes for approval or refusal of Merger 
Directive benefits.30 However, in observance with the principle of effectiveness and, 
more specifically, the requirement of legal certainty, the ECJ found that relevant 
procedural rules “(…) should be sufficiently precise, clear and foreseeable to enable 
taxpayers to know precisely their rights in order to ensure that they are able to benefit 
from tax advantages under the directive and to rely on them, if necessary, before the 
national courts.”31 In the particular set of facts, the Court established that the pre-
approval procedure envisaged in French domestic law failed to meet these standards, 
due to the apparent lack of detailed procedural rules and the level of discretion 
exercised by the tax authorities in delivering their decisions.32 For the purposes of the 
present paper it is even more important how the Court addressed what is essentially 
the burden of proof issue: “(…) However, in so far as the legislation at issue in the 
main proceedings, in order to grant the benefit of the deferral of the taxation of the 
capital gains under Directive 90/434, systematically and unconditionally requires the 
taxpayer to show that the operation concerned is justified on economic grounds and 
does not have as its principal objective, or as one of its principal objectives, tax evasion 
or tax avoidance, without the tax authority being required to provide even prima facie 
evidence that there are no valid commercial reasons or evidence of tax evasion or 
tax avoidance, that legislation introduces a general presumption of tax evasion or 
tax avoidance.”33 Put another way, the ECJ apparently shares the view that national 
revenue bodies, in the course of procedures related to tax-neutral reorganizations, 
should initially present at least some degree of evidence that the abstract notion of tax 
avoidance has materialized with regard to the individual situation. Failing to respect 
this essentially amounts to creating the general presumption of tax avoidance, which 
is prohibited under EU law. Accordingly, in our view, the ECJ’s decision in Euro Park 
Services has to be read as demanding concrete substantiation of the tax authority’s 
claim that tax avoidance is indeed at work, lest the full burden of proof be borne by 
the taxpayer.34
Taking another look at Croatian rules and administrative practices against the 
backdrop of the above findings, it is reasonable to conclude that taxpayers involved 
in M&A transactions in Croatia may find it excessively difficult to exercise the rights 
30 Euro Park Service, op. cit., para. 36. Compare in that regard the ECJ’s reasoning in Pelati, op. 
cit., paras. 21-37.
31 Euro Park Service, op. cit., para. 40.
32 Ibid., paras. 40-46.
33 Ibid., para. 56.
34 Compare also the experience with the abuse of Merger Directive benefits in Denmark, as 
accounted by Bolander J., Graff Nielsen, J., Denmark, in Meussen G., (ed.), The Burden of 
Proof in Tax Law, IBFD 2013, pp. 97-98. As put by the authors: “(…) Hence, the taxpayer has 
to present the relevant considerations in connection with the operation to the tax administration 
while the administration – in accordance with the inquisitorial procedure principle – may ask 
questions of the taxpayer who is required to answer these questions to the best of his ability. 
The consequence is that a presupposition of tax avoidance eo ipso requires a secure evidentiary 
foundation, and that the taxpayer and the tax administration in effect share the burden of proof 
– each pulling on different ends of the rope so to speak – to establish whether tax avoidance or 
tax evasion is the primary purpose of a given reorganization.”
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provided for in the Merger Directive. The most problematic aspect is that Croatian tax 
authorities ostensibly share the view that the evidentiary onus de facto lies completely 
with the taxpayer; it is fully up to the taxpayer, upon initiating the pertinent procedure, 
to prove that the transaction at hand makes commercial and economic sense and 
to debunk the presumption of tax avoidance.35 While it is important to reiterate 
that taxpayers wanting to make use of the Merger Directive benefits are bound to 
encounter some evidentiary requirements, particularly related to a more or less 
detailed description of the planned reorganization, ECJ’s case law suggests that tax 
authorities should refrain from relying on blanket statements that tax avoidance is 
the aim underlying the transaction, without either providing any counter-evidence, or 
making a reasonable effort to clarify open issues in a two-way communication with 
the taxpayer(s). 
Furthermore, one also needs to take into account the general rules of Croatian tax 
law on the burden of proof in tax matters, enacted in the General Tax Act (hereinafter: 
GTA).36 In accordance with Article 88 GTA, tax authorities bear the burden of proof 
in relation to all facts that establish tax liability or lead to the increase in tax burden, 
while the taxpayer bears the burden of proof in relation to the facts pertaining to a 
minimization of tax or tax exemptions. Since the potential existence of tax avoidance 
motive is a fact that results in higher tax liability in cases of corporate reorganizations, 
it should be up to the tax authority to submit proper evidence thereto. In addition, one 
should take note of the principle of good faith, which has been enshrined in Croatian 
tax law ever since 2000, providing that the parties in the tax relationship should act 
conscientiously and fairly in accordance with the law.37 While this principle demands 
stronger co-operation, even partnership-like relations, between taxpayers and tax 
authorities, administrative practice in the area dealt with in this paper certainly does 
not fit the bill.38
2.3. Relevance of other anti-abuse rules and principles
The rule contained in Article 20.p PTA is known in the tax doctrine as a targeted 
anti-avoidance rule (TAAR), i.e. a rule aimed at curbing a specific tax avoidance 
technique, in this case a solely-tax-motivated business restructuring operation.39 But 
the question arises as to whether tax authorities may also challenge the transaction(s) 
35 See the previously-cited non-binding tax ruling, Croatian Tax Administration, supra n. 18.
36 Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia, no. 115/2016.
37 For the current version of the codification of the principle of good faith, see Article 9 of the 
GTA. 
38 Generally on the features of tax relationship in Croatia see Gadžo,S., Tax Procedure Law 
in Transition: Croatian Experience, in: Milosavljević, B., et al. (eds), Law and Transition: 
Collection of Papers, University of Belgrade, Faculty of Law, 2017, pp. 177-189.
39 For a general description of TAARs (or SAARs, as they are also known in the academic 
literature), see e.g. Čičin-Šain, N., Analyse comparée des dispositifs de lutte contre l’évasion 
fiscale en droit fiscal croate et français Le cas de l’impôt sur les sociétés, L.G.D.J 2017, pp. 
89-92.; Gadžo S., Klemenčić, I., Time to stop avoiding the tax avoidance issue in Croatia? A 
proposal based on recent developments in the European Union, Financial theory and practice 
38(3), 2014, pp. 282.
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at hand on the basis of other anti-tax avoidance rules enshrined under the Croatian 
legislation. In this regard, comparative experiences tell us that revenue bodies 
sometimes do not shy away from relying on anti-avoidance rules or judicial doctrines 
of more general application in denying the tax benefits for envisaged M&As.40
While it is beyond the scope of the present paper to give full details of the 
Croatian anti-avoidance legislative framework41, some recent developments in this 
area are particularly worth exploring, especially the introduction of a new GAAR by 
virtue of 2016 amendments to the PTA.42 As set out in the newly adopted Article 5.a 
of the PTA – curiously drafted on the basis of Article 2(1) of the EU Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive43 – taxpayers shall not be granted any benefits envisaged in corporate tax 
legislation in case they make use of an arrangement or a series of arrangements which 
are classified as non-genuine. The article defines “non-genuine arrangements” as any 
business transaction, scheme, action, operation, understanding, promise or event, 
comprising of one or more than one steps or parts, which has been put into place for 
the main purpose or one of the main purposes of obtaining a tax advantage, having 
regard to all relevant facts and circumstances.44 In addition, it is made clear that such 
arrangements may be considered non-genuine only to the extent that they are not put 
into place for valid commercial reasons which reflect economic reality, i.e. if they are 
put into place for the purposes of tax evasion or fraud.45
Further instructions on the application of the new GAAR are found in the OPT. 
Accordingly, it is clarified that in the assessment of the arrangement’s genuineness, 
it is important to establish whether the arrangement, regardless of any subjective 
intention of the taxpayer, defeats the object, spirit and the purpose of the pertinent 
tax provision.46 Moreover, some typical examples of non-genuine arrangements are 
provided, including the so-called U-turn transactions and transactions that entail a 
mismatch between tax benefits and associated business risks.47 
40 See Kroppen, H., Silva, J. C., op. cit., pp. 27-31; Cotrut, M., Ambagtsheer-Pakarinen, L., op. 
cit., sec. 7.3.1.
41 For more details see e.g. Žunić Kovačević, N., et al., Croatia in M. Lang et al. (eds.), GAARs 
- A Key Element of Tax Systems in the Post- BEPS World, IBFD 2016, pp. 205-218.; Gadžo, 
S., Klemenčić, I., op. cit., pp. 290-293.; Rogić Lugarić, T., Promišljanja o općem pravilu za 
sprječavanje zakonitog izbjegavanja porezne obveze in Arbutina, H., Rogić Lugarić T., (eds.), 
Spomenica prof. dr. sc. Juri Šimoviću, Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 2017, pp. 237-
239.
42 A detailed account of this legislative development is given in Čičin-Šain, N., Opće pravilo 
za sprječavanje izbjegavanja poreza uvedeno u sustav poreza na dobitak, Pravo i porezi, 10 
(2016), pp. 12-17.
43 Directive 2011/96/EU on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent 
companies and subsidiaries of different Member States, OJ L 345, 29.12.2011, with subsequent 
amendments. For criticism of such approach of Croatian legislator in implementing the 2015 
amendments to the Parent-Subsidiary Directive see Čičin-Šain, N., op. cit., p. 13.
44 Article 5.a(1) and 5.a(2) of the PTA.
45 Article 5.a(3) of the PTA.
46 Article 11.c(2) of the OCT.
47 Article 11.c(2) of the OCT. The examples are essentially copy-pasted from an earlier attempt 
of the EU institutions to introduce a uniform GAAR in the internal market. See Commission 
Recommendation on aggressive tax planning, C (2012) 8806 final, OJ L 338, 12.12.2012. 
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Although the necessity for a comprehensive reform of the Croatian anti-
tax avoidance framework has been articulated in academic literature48, the newly 
introduced GAAR inevitably breeds uncertainty. The lack of case law hitherto makes 
it even harder to speculate how the tax authorities will interpret contentious elements 
of the GAAR, such as “arrangements”, “valid commercial reasons”, “economic 
reality”, etc.49 For the purposes of the present paper, it is, however, vital to explore 
possible ramifications of the newly-introduced GAAR on M&A transactions involving 
Croatian target companies. 
Three points deserve special attention. First, regarding the legal compatibility 
between the GAAR and the TAAR found in Article 20.p PTA, a question may arise 
whether tax planning structures that passed the CTA’s scrutiny under the special rule 
may still be assessed, potentially resulting in the denial of pertinent tax benefits, by 
virtue of the GAAR.50 If one strictly applies the lex specialis doctrine, the answer 
would be in the negative, i.e. the application of the GAAR would be precluded. Such 
inference seems rather convincing if one takes into account the legal nature of the 
Croatian GAAR, which is essentially a copycat of the GAAR laid down in the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive. If one acknowledges that the latter is not a “principles-based 
GAAR” akin to its counterparts found in some domestic tax systems (e.g. that of 
the United Kingdom), but rather a rule having a narrower and more specific remit51, 
we share the view that the CTA should abstain from applying the GAAR to business 
restructuring transactions previously tested under Article 20.p of the PTA. Second, 
and more important for practical purposes, if one compares the wording of these rules, 
the room for possible conflict between the two is ostensibly very limited. Namely, as 
already mentioned above (section 2.2), the taxpayer may escape the application of 
the TAAR if he demonstrates valid business reasons for the business restructuring 
operation. Very similarly, under the newly-adopted GAAR, taxpayer’s arrangements 
are considered non-genuine only to the extent that they are not put into place for 
valid commercial reasons reflecting economic reality.52 One may even go a step 
48 See e.g. Prebble, R., Does Croatia Need a General Anti-Avoidance Rule? Recommended 
Changes to Croatia’s Current Legislative Framework, Financial theory and practice, 29(3), 
2005, pp. 211-227; Gadžo, S., Klemenčić, I., op. cit., pp. 290-297; Čičin-Šain, N., op. cit., pp. 
Rogić Lugarić, T., op. cit., pp. 237-239.
49 For a critical overview of these elements found in the GAAR enshrined in Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive see e.g. Weber, D., The New Common Minimum Anti-Abuse Rule in the EU Parent-
Subsidiary Directive: Background, Impact, Applicability, Purpose and Effect, Intertax 44(2), 
2016, pp. 98–129.
50 Generally on the relationship between GAARs and TAARs see Krever, R., General Report: 
GAARs in Lang, M., et al. (eds.), GAARs - A Key Element of Tax Systems in the Post- BEPS 
World, IBFD 2016, pp. 13-14.; Rosenblatt, P., Tron, M. E., General Report, in: IFA Cahiers Vol. 
103a: Seeking anti-avoidance measures of general nature and scope - GAAR and other rules, 
2018, pp. 23-24.
51 See Tavares, R., Bogenschneider, B., The New De Minimis Anti-Abuse Rule in the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive: Validating EU Tax Competition and Corporate Tax Avoidance?, Intertax 
43(8/9), 2015, pp. 488-489.
52 For a detailed analysis of this “artificiality test” or “substance test” of the GAAR enshrined in 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive see Weber, D., op. cit., pp. 113-115. 
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further and embrace the introduction of the GAAR as a step towards clarifying the 
ambiguities in application of the pertinent TAAR. This line of argument resonates 
well with a standard role played by GAARs in comparative tax systems, namely that 
of drawing the legislative boundary between legitimate tax planning and unacceptable 
tax avoidance.53 Third, and related to the previous point, the “substance test” or the 
objective prong of the new GAAR should not be all that unfamiliar to Croatian tax 
practitioners, since the principle of “economic approach” – or, using the comparative 
tax jargon, “substance-over-form” principle – has been one of the keystones of 
Croatian tax law for almost two decades now.54 This principle sets out the approach 
of interpretation of tax laws, giving legal basis to the CTA to disregard taxpayers’ 
structures that are deemed abusive and impose the tax directly on the underlying 
commercial reality. The jurisprudence of the Croatian administrative courts regarding 
substance-over-form principle confirms that taxpayers may not rely solely on the 
classification of their actions under civil or commercial law in order to obtain tax 
benefits envisaged in relevant tax laws.55 Conversely, the points of departure for 
classifying facts for tax-law purposes are various elements associated with economic 
substance, including commercial rationale of the transaction, actual behaviour of the 
parties, existence and usage of tangible assets etc. 
Accordingly, if we imagine a business restructuring in the form of company 
division, where certain valuable assets are carved-out and transferred to a newly 
formed entity, both the TAAR of Article 20.p CTA and the newly-adopted GAAR 
would call for an assessment of whether the transaction as a whole, and its individual 
steps, make commercial sense. Relatedly, in order to get the benefits of tax neutral 
restructuring, the taxpayer should be able to demonstrate that the spin-off entity is 
able to have commercial life of its own, e.g. that it has adequate premises, employees, 
operating assets, separate business activities and is able to bear significant risks.56 If 
this is not the case, then it is safe to conclude that the transaction lacks valid business 
rationale and amounts to a “non-genuine arrangement”. In more practical terms, this 
testing of economic substance will usually boil down to an analysis of the relevant 
documentation.57 This makes the above analysis of the onus probandi issue even more 
vexing. 
3. THE LIMITATIONS ON CARRY-FORWARDS OF 
TRANSFERRING ENTITY’S TAX LOSSES
As already explained in the present paper (section 2), an M&A transaction 
carried through a “share deal” offers, as a general rule, the benefit of preserving the 
target company’s tax attributes and enables their subsequent utilization at the hand of 
53 See Gadžo, S., Klemenčić, I., op. cit., pp. 282-283 and the sources referred to therein. 
54 Generally on this, Žunić Kovačević, N., et al., op. cit., pp. 206-207. The principle is enshrined 
in Article 11 of the current version of the GTA.
55 See e.g. Decision of the Administrative Court in Rijeka, Case No. 6 UsI-792/13-9, 18 July 
2014.
56 Compare also Kroppen, H., Silva, J. C., op. cit., pp. 30.
57 See also Cotrut, M., Ambagtsheer-Pakarinen, L., op. cit., sec. 7.3.2.
N. ŽUNIĆ KOVAČEVIĆ, S. GADŽO, Tax-related Risks of Mergers and Acquisitions...
Zb. Prav. fak. Sveuč. u Rij., vol. 39, br. 4 (Posebni broj), 1731-1749 (2018)1742
the acquirer. In the M&A environment special attention in this regard is paid to the 
preservation and usage of tax losses incurred by the target company, i.e. rules on loss 
carryovers. Within the due diligence process it is vital to examine the possibility that 
some tax losses of the target may be lost due to rules prohibiting tax loss trafficking, 
enshrined in the domestic law of a number of countries.58 Such anti-tax loss trafficking 
provisions may be branded as another species of TAARs.59
Against this backdrop, it has to be noted first, that Croatian corporate tax law 
allows only for loss carry-forwards, not carry-backs.60 Loss carry-forward is limited 
for the period of five years, i.e. five future taxable periods, and earlier losses are to 
be offset before the later ones.61 Domestic anti-loss trafficking rules employ both an 
“activity test” or “economic identity test” and an “ownership test”.62 
More precisely, under Article 17(5) of the PTA, the right to use earlier tax losses 
of the target company (legal predecessor) ceases for the acquirer (legal successor) 
in two specific cases: 1) where, within the period of two years after the transaction, 
business activity of the target is significantly changed;63 2) if the target company did 
not perform any business activities within two years preceding the transaction. In 
addition to this business activity test, Article 17(7) of the PTA sets out an ownership 
test, prescribing that tax losses may not be carry-forwarded in case of a significant 
change in the ownership of the target company, i.e. when more than 50% of target’s 
equity change owner(s) in relation to the beginning of the tax year.64 However, in 
the described cases there is also an “escape rule”: under Art. 17(8) of the PTA, the 
legal successor of the target may still utilize target’s losses if the change of business 
activity, or the change of ownership, had the aim to preserve employment or the 
aim of business recovery.65 The elements of this escape rule are further clarified in 
the OPT.66 Importantly, the concept of “business recovery” (sanacija poslovanja) is 
deemed to include all procedures aimed at increasing revenue through the revival and 
continuation of business activities, along with job preservation.67
Regarding the application of the ownership, there has been some ambiguity in 
tax practice, particularly concerning cases where the economic identity of the target 
remains unchanged after the share transaction, i.e. where only ownership of the 
company is significantly changed. In its public ruling the CTA offered a pro-taxpayer 
58 Generally on loss trafficking and the rules aimed at curbing it, see Endres, D., Spengel, C. D., 
op. cit., pp. 99-100.
59 On the discussion on the role of TAARs and GAARs see section 2.3. above.
60 This is provided in Article 17(2) PTA. For a concise comparative overview of loss carryovers 
see e.g. Endres, D., Spengel, C. D., op. cit., p. 98; Avi Yonah, R., Sartori, N., Marian, O., Global 
Perspectives on Income Taxation Law, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 84-85. 
61 Art. 17(4) of the PTA. 
62 Generally on these typical criteria used in anti-loss trafficking rules see Endres, D., Spengel, C. 
D., op. cit., p. 99.
63 What constitutes a „significant change of activity“ is clarified in Article 38(5) OPT, by reference 
to the National Classification of Activities (NKD 2007).
64 Art. 17(7) of the PTA.
65 Art. 17(8) of the PTA.
66 Article 38, paras. 6-9 of the OPT. 
67 Article 38(8) of the OPT.
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interpretation of the relevant statutory provision, making clear that loss-carry-forwards 
will be denied only if the change in ownership is accompanied with the change in 
economic identity of the target.68
4. PROCEDURAL INSTRUMENTS FOR ENHANCING TAX 
CERTAINTY IN BUSINESS RESTRUCTURING TRANSACTIONS
Within the maze of anti-tax avoidance rules relevant for M&As involving 
Croatian target companies – explored in previous sections of this paper – tax risks 
abound for prospective investors. Particularly disconcerting is the increasing number 
of cases in which tax authorities deny the sought-after tax benefits by qualifying a 
transaction as abusive, often on arbitrary grounds and without offering reasonable 
evidentiary substantiation for such findings.69 These concerns only add to the plethora 
of issues related to the overall tax environment in Croatia. Namely, recent studies 
using data collected from business representatives and tax advisors display that key 
problems include, inter alia, the following: (i) frequent changes and complexity of 
tax legislation, which is sometimes even applied retrospectively; (ii) tax authorities’ 
prejudicial view of the taxpayers as tax evaders; (iii) excessive length of tax dispute 
procedures; (iv) unwillingness of the tax authorities to truly co-operate with taxpayers; 
(v) practice of non-uniform application of tax legislation by different organizational 
units within the CTA; (vi) legal framework and practice of tax audit procedures (vii) 
unsatisfactory statutory provisions on advance tax rulings, resulting in their underuse 
in practice.70 All of these factors contribute to the conclusion that legal uncertainty is 
a pervasive feature of the Croatian tax system.71 This should be particularly worrying 
for policymakers, since there is ample evidence that tax uncertainty, particularly 
regarding corporate income tax and value added tax (VAT), has serious impact on 
investment and location decisions.72 
Against this backdrop, it may be somewhat comforting that in recent years 
Croatian tax procedure law underwent significant modernization, with the introduction 
of new, compliance-oriented instruments.73 In addition, this was coupled with other 
institutional and regulatory developments important especially for big businesses, 
such as the formation of a special Large Taxpayers Unit within the CTA, introduction 
68 See Croatian Tax Administration, opinion No. 410-01/10-01/1624, 16 August 2010. This 
clarification has been subsequently included in Article 38(4) of the OPT.
69 On the problem of burden of proof in this context see section 2.2 of this paper. 
70 See Stojić H., et al., White Book 2017, Foreign Investors Council 2017, 39-44; Gadžo, S., op. 
cit., pp. 182-183, and the sources referred to therein. 
71 Quite interestingly, one recent survey, conducted among tax professionals operating in 28 
European countries, shows that only France and Italy fare worse than Croatia in terms of tax 
uncertainty. See Deloitte (2015), European tax survey 2015: Transparency, simplification and 
collaboration, https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/pages/tax/articles/european-tax-survey.
html (accessed 12 November 2018).
72 See IMF & OECD (2017), OECD/IMF Report on Tax Certainty, http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-
policy/tax-certainty-report-oecd-imf-report-g20-finance-ministers-march-2017.pdf (accessed 
12 November 2018), pp. 25-32.
73 For an overview see e.g. Gadžo, S., op. cit., pp. 184-188.
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of “tax settlements” within tax audit procedures etc. Accordingly, de lege lata there 
are some instruments prospective investors may rely upon in order to mitigate the 
risk of overstepping the boundary of legitimate tax planning within the M&A context. 
Most notably, as of 2015 Croatian taxpayers may obtain an advance ruling 
regarding the planned transaction, as set out by Article 10 of the GTA.74 While the 
objective scope of the advance ruling scheme is, as it stands today, severely limited, 
assessment of the corporate tax base related to corporate restructurings is explicitly 
mentioned as one of the questions taxpayers may seek clarification on from the CTA.75 
Accordingly, taxpayers may obtain beforehand the opinion of the tax authorities’ 
whether the benefits of tax neutrality would apply to the planned transaction – e.g. 
also with regard to loss carry-forwards – thus increasing the level of legal certainty. 
An even stronger level of tax certainty is guaranteed where Croatian target 
companies have, prior to the planned business restructuring transaction, been engaged 
in the recently introduced horizontal monitoring scheme, regulated in Article 70 of 
the current version of the GTA. Within this scheme, the taxpayer obliges to be fully 
transparent on his activities and tax risks, while complying with all duties prescribed 
by tax legislation in a timely manner. Conversely, tax authorities need to adjust the 
extent of using their supervisory discretion to the quality of the taxpayer’s internal 
control and auditing processes. Moreover, they are obliged to interact with the 
taxpayer quickly and transparently, so to avoid any potential disputes.76
Taking a brief look de lege ferenda, Croatian M&A landscape would undeniably 
benefit from further improvements on the procedural plane. Since it seems that the 
resolution of tax disputes is the Achilles heel of the entire tax system, possible answers 
lie in: (i) the creation of a more robust compliance programmes77; (ii) introduction 
of an additional tier of dispute resolution, in the form of quasi-judicial, independent 
panels or committee, which may issue (non-binding) opinions on the application of 
pertinent tax-law provisions, including GAARs and other anti-tax avoidance rules78; 
(iii) usage of (mandatory) arbitration, especially in the cross-border context79. Against 
the background of recent developments in Croatian anti-tax avoidance framework, 
even some more modest steps, such as timely and more systematic publication of tax 
74 For general information on advance ruling system in Croatia see Žunić Kovačević, N., 
Prethodna obvezujuća porezna mišljenja – novi institut hrvatskog poreznog postupka, Zbornik 
Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci, 37(1), 2016, pp. 267-289.
75 See Article 10(2)(3). Even more notably, within the recently proposed amendments to the GTA, 
the objective scope of the scheme will be severely broadened. 
76 See Gadžo, S., op. cit., pp. 187-188 and the sources referred to therein. 
77 See e.g. IMF & OECD (2017), op. cit., pp. 50-52.
78 For some comparative experiences with this instrument see e.g. Rosenblatt, P., Tron, M. E., op. 
cit., p. 38; 
79 See, e.g. IMF & OECD (2017), op. cit., pp. 49-50, 57; Del Campo, C., General report in IFA 
Cahiers de Droit Fiscal Vol. 101a: Dispute resolution procedures in international tax matters, 
2016, pp. 59-62. For an analysis of alternative dispute resolution instruments in the context 
of Croatian tax law see Rogić Lugarić, T., Čičin-Šain, N., Alternativno rješavanje sporova u 
poreznom pravu: utopija ili rješenje?, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu 64(3), 2014, pp. 
347-375; Žunić Kovačević, N., Upravnosudska kontrola u poreznim stvarima, op. cit., pp. 288-
295. 
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authorities’ positions and guidance on specific issues, may go a far way in abating 
legal uncertainty for taxpayers. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Drawing the line between legitimate tax planning and illegitimate tax avoidance 
is one of the Gordian knots in tax law theory and practice. This paper has tried to offer 
a descriptive and systematic account of anti-tax avoidance rules that may be used the 
Croatian tax authorities in order to deny the tax benefits of a business restructuring 
operation. What emerges from the analysis is that prospective investors should, more 
than ever before, structure all the steps of an M&A transaction in a way that reflects 
the underlying economic substance and makes commercial sense. Failing to do so may 
trigger the scrutiny of tax authorities, on the basis of either targeted anti-avoidance 
rules (TAARs) or the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR). We have underlined 
how in this context a special set of problems arises from a procedural perspective. 
Most notably, practical application of the rules on burden of proof result in great 
difficulties for the taxpayer to demonstrate proper business purpose(s) underlying 
the restructuring and thus quash the presumption of abusive behaviour. The resulting 
uncertainties are bound to increase in light of newly adopted rules, such as the GAAR 
that is based on the ambiguous interpretation of the “genuineness” or “artificiality” of 
taxpayers’ arrangements. 
Based on the above, it comes as no surprise that the answer to the main 
research question seems rather inconclusive. It is, however, safe to assume that M&A 
transactions the conduct of which may be substantiated with detailed due diligence 
analyses and that offer clear, tangible benefits to the participants will remain on the 
safe side of the CTA’s inquiry. The role of documentary requirements in this regard 
cannot be overstated. Furthermore, as discussed above, taxpayers may rely on some 
procedural instruments to mitigate future tax risks in the M&A environment. While 
advance tax rulings appear to be particularly useful for this purpose de lege lata, future 
modernization of dispute resolution framework would serve a great deal in enhancing 
legal certainty for prospective investors. As to this last point, some optimism is in 
order, considering how in recent years the Croatian policymakers have responded 
relatively quickly to relevant developments at the global and EU level. 
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Sažetak
POREZNI RIZICI SPAJANJA I PREUZIMANJA 
TRGOVAČKIH DRUŠTAVA U HRVATSKOJ: GDJE 
JE GRANICA IZMEĐU LEGITIMNOG POSLOVNOG 
RESTRUKTURIRANJA I AGRESIVNOG POREZNOG 
PLANIRANJA?
Transakcije spajanja i preuzimanja često su izvor raznovrsnih poreznih rizika. 
U recentnoj praksi hrvatskih poreznih tijela sve su češći slučajevi odbijanja poreznih 
pogodnosti za navedene transakcije, temeljem različitih protuevazijskih pravila 
ugrađenih u domaće zakonodavstvo. Riječju, analizom gospodarske biti planiranog 
restrukturiranja porezna tijela izvode zaključak kako je posrijedi (zakonito) 
izbjegavanje plaćanja poreza. Cilj je rada, u svjetlu važećeg protuevazijskog pravnog 
okvira, ocrtati granicu između dopuštenog i legitimnog poreznog planiranja s jedne 
strane te porezne evazije s druge. U tom smislu posebno će se upozoriti i na relevantne 
postupovno-pravne aspekte, poput pravila o teretu dokazivanja. 
Ključne riječi: spajanja i preuzimanja; porezno planiranje; zakonito izbjegavanje 
plaćanja poreza; porezna neutralnost; teret dokazivanja; opće 
pravilo protiv izbjegavanja poreza.
Zusammenfasssung
STEUERBEZOGENE RISIKEN DER FUSIONEN 
UND ÜBERNAHMEN IN KROATIEN: 
ABGRENZUNG ZWISCHEN LEGITIMER 
UNTERNEHMENSUMSTRUKTURIERUNG UND 
AGGRESSIVER STEUERPLANUNG 
Durch Fusionen und Übernahmen der kroatischen Zielunternehmen können 
bedeutende Steuerrisiken für heimische und fremde kontrollierende Unternehmen 
entstehen. In den letzten Jahren haben kroatische Steuerbehörden begonnen, den 
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wirtschaftlichen Gehalt vorgesehener Fusionen und Übernahmen zu bewerten. Dabei 
werden dem kontrollierenden Unternehmen oft die Steuervorteile verwehrt, was den 
ganzen Umstrukturierungsprozess teurer macht. Die kroatischen Steuerbehörden 
stützen sich dabei auf unzählige Regeln der Bekämpfung von Steuervermeidung, 
gemäß welchen die M&A-Transaktionen als missbräuchlich bezeichnet werden 
können. Demgemäß wird in diesem Beitrag beschreibend und systematisch erklärt, 
wie die kroatische Gesetzgebung zur Bekämpfung von Steuervermeidung die 
Fusions- und Übernahmeaktivitäten hindern kann. Dabei ist es das Ziel dieses Beitrags 
sowohl aus der Perspektive des materiellen Rechts als auch des Verfahrensrechts zu 
untersuchen, wo die imaginäre Grenze zwischen der legitimen und missbräuchlichen 
Steuerplanung liegt. 
Schlüsselwörter: Fusionen und Übernahmen; Steuerplanung; gesetzlich 
Steuerzahlungen vermeiden; Steuerneutralität; Beweislast; 
die allgemeine Regel gegen Steuerhinterziehung.
Riassunto
I RISCHI FISCALI DI FUSIONE E RILEVAMENTO DELLE 
SOCIETÀ COMMERCIALI IN CROAZIA: DOV’È IL 
CONFINE TRA LA RISTRUTTURAZIONE LEGITTIMA ED 
UNA PIANIFICAZIONE FISCALE AGGRESSIVA?
Le operazioni volte alla fusione ed al rilevamento sovente sono fonte di vari 
rischi fiscali. Nella recente prassi degli enti fiscali croati sono sempre più frequenti 
i casi di rigetto di agevolazioni fiscali per dette operazioni, in ragione di differenti 
regole antievasione radicate nella legislazione domestica. In sostanza, mediate 
l’analisi del contenuto economico della ristrutturazione pianificata gli enti fiscali 
giungono alla conclusione come si tratti di una (legale) elusione del pagamento del 
fisco. Lo scopo del lavoro, alla luce del vigente quadro normativo anti-evasione, è 
quello di delineare il confine tra la pianificazione fiscale ammessa e legittima da una 
parte e l’evasione fiscale dall’altra. In tale senso, in particolare se ne sottolineeranno 
gli aspetti procedurali, quali le regole sull’onere probatorio. 
Parole chiave: fusioni e rilevamenti; pianificazione fiscale; elusione del 
pagamento del fisco; neutralità fiscale; onere probatorio; 
regola generale contro l’evasione fiscale.

